

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT

OF

DESPATCHES

Basic exhibits of despatches (1941)

| Date | To | Action | Page |
|-------------|---------------|--|------|
| 1 Apr..... | OPNAV..... | COM ALL NAV DIST..... | 1 |
| 4 Apr..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1-16..... | 2 |
| 18 Apr..... | OPNAV..... | ALUSNA, PEIPING, ASTALUSNA CHUNGKING & SHANGHAI..... | 3 |
| 3 Jul..... | CNO..... | CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT COM15 (AIRMAIL) SPENAVO LONDON..... | 4 |
| 3 Jul..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF, CINCPAC..... | 5 |
| 7 Jul..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... | 6 |
| 7 Jul..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... | 7 |
| 15 Jul..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... | 8 |
| 17 Jul..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... | 9 |
| 19 Jul..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... | 10 |
| 19 Jul..... | COM 16..... | OPNAV..... | 11 |
| 20 Jul..... | COM 16..... | OPNAV PRIORITY ROUTINE—CINC- PAC, CINCAF, COM 14..... | 12 |
| 25 Jul..... | CNO..... | LIST OF ADDRESSESE CINCPAC, CIN- CAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO LIST OF ADDRESSEES..... | 13 |
| 25 Jul..... | CNO..... | LIST OF ADDRESSEES..... | 13 |
| 25 Jul..... | CNO..... | CINCPAC, CINCAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO LONDON..... | 14 |
| 14 Aug..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF, CINPAC, CINCLANT..... | 15 |
| 28 Aug..... | CNO..... | CINCPAC, COMPAN NAVCOAST FRONTIER..... | 16 |
| 9 Oct..... | CNO..... | U. S. HOLDERS WPL52..... | 17 |
| 16 Oct..... | CNO..... | CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCAF..... | 18 |
| 16 Oct..... | OPNAV..... | ALL MERCHANT SHIPS..... | 19 |
| 17 Oct..... | OPNAV..... | NAVSTA TUTULA SAMOA CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 11-16..... | 20 |
| 17 Oct..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF, COM 12..... | 21 |
| 17 Oct..... | CNO..... | CINCPAC..... | 22 |
| 23 Oct..... | OPNAV..... | COM 12, 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF..... | 23 |
| 4 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 11-16..... | 24 |
| 18 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14..... | 25 |
| 20 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF, COMPACSO NAV COASTAL- FRON..... | 26 |
| 21 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC, CINCAF..... | 27 |
| 22 Nov..... | CINCPAC..... | OPNAV..... | 28 |
| 22 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC..... | 29 |
| 24 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC..... | 30 |
| 23 Nov..... | COM 12..... | OPNAV..... | 31 |
| 24 Nov..... | CNO..... | CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 11, 12, 13, 15..... | 32 |
| 24 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... | 33 |
| 25 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | COM 12..... | 34 |
| 27 Nov..... | OPNAV38S..... | COM ALNAL COAST FRON COM 14, 16, CINPAC, CINCAF..... | 35 |
| 27 Nov..... | CNO..... | CINCAF, CINCPAC..... | 36 |
| 27 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | COM 1-13, 15, NAVY YARD WASHING- TON, GOV GUAM & SOMOA..... | 37 |
| 28 Nov..... | CNO..... | COM PNNCP, COM PSNCF..... | 38 |
| 2 Dec..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... | 39 |
| 1 Dec..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, 16..... | 40 |
| 3 Dec..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF, COM 16..... | 41 |
| 4 Dec..... | OPNAV..... | ALUSNA TOKYO, BANKOK ASTA- LUSNA PEIPING, SHANGHAI..... | 42 |
| 4 Dec..... | OPNAV..... | CO MARDET PEIPING CO MARDET TIENTSIN..... | 43 |
| 4 Dec..... | OPNAV..... | NAVSTA GUAM..... | 44 |
| 6 Dec..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC..... | 45 |
| 6 Dec..... | COM 14..... | OPNAV..... | 46 |

[1] Top Secret

1 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: Com all Nav Districts NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa

Info:

Ø12358

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities

in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

[2] Top Secret

4 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC CINCAF Com 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Info: CINCLANT COMBATFOR COMSCOFOR COMBASEFOR COMDTS Navy Yards Boston, Portsmouth, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Mare Island, Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, NAD Puget Sound, Mare Island, Oahu & Cavite.

041700

Except DESDIV 50 (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization.

At discretion fleet commanders will accept final increment of mobilization supply ammunition.

Strip ship in accordance with orders action ADDEES.

Ships assigned availability for drydocking at ADDEES discretion.

For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are not to return to mobilization ports on the continent.

[3] Confidential

18 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: ALUSNA Peiping; Astalusna Chungking; Astalusna Shanghai.

Info: CINCPAC; CINCAF; COMSIXTEEN.

181535

Include CINCPAC as information addressee in all despatch reports also furnish one copy of all intelligence reports plus present distribution dirert to CINCPAC. Send them by way of issuing officer Comsixteen for secret and confidential and through Fleet Postoff Pearl for other.

[4] Top Secret

3 July 1941

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: CINCAF-CINCPAC-CINCLANT-COM 15 (Airmail) SPENAVD London

Info:

031939

[Paraphrase]

The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out, however the CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, army and air bases in Indo China. The neutrality pact with Russia will be abrogated and major military effort will be against their maritime provinces which will probably be toward the end of July though attack may be deferred until after collapse of European Russia. They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by 1 Aug. Movement of Jap flag shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned. Using utmost secrecy, inform principal Army commanders and your own immediate subordinates except Ghormley. Also British Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador.

Copy to

COS, US Army

OP-12

[5] Top Secret

3 July 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT COM 11-12-13-14-15-16; ALUSNA London: ALUSNA
Tokyo; ASTALUSNA Shanghai

ø3213ø

[Paraphrase]

Definite information has been received that between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Gov't has issued orders for 7 of the 11 Nip vessels now in the North Atlantic and Caribbean area to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under routine schedules three of the remaining ships will move to the Pacific during this same period. The one remaining ship, under routine movement, can be clear by July 22nd. Briefly, all Nipponese merchant vessels will be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22nd. In Jap business communities strong rumors are current that Russia will be attacked by Japan on July 29th. From unusually reliable Chinese sources it is stated that, within 2 weeks Japan will abrogate neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution of Jap Fleet appears normal and that it is capable of movement either north or south. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 29th dash August first, is indicated by the foregoing.

[6] Top secret

7 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cinpac

ø7ø224

Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329:

Japan directs eight Marus on East Coast United States rush cargo handling and proceed Colon Pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on following schedule: 16th, Tokai; 17th, Amagisan; 18th, Awajisan; 19th, Tosan; 20th, Kiyosumi; 21st, Kirishima; 22nd, Norfolk and Asuka X.

Tokyo to Berlin 2 July 585: (English text note to Ribbentrop in part)

"Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities regarding Soviet in order join forces with Germany in actively combatting Communist and destroying Communist system in eastern Siberia X at same time Japan cannot and will not relax efforts in the south to restrain Britain and United States X new Indo-China bases will intensify restraint and be vital contribution to Axis victory."

Berlin to Tokyo 2 July 825:

Oshima delivers above note and tells Ribbentrop in part, "Matsuoka will soon submit a decision X if you Germans had only let us know you were going to fight Russia so soon we might have been ready X We were planning to settle South Seas questions and China incident hence decision cannot be reached immediately, but Japan will not sit on fence while Germany fights Russia."

[7] Top secret

7 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cinpac

ø7ø243

Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 16 June 519:

Matsuoka requests Ribbentrop's aid in demand on French for following naval bases: "Saigon and Camranh"; and following air bases in southern French Indo-China: "Saigon, Bienhoa, Phnompenh, Kompontrach, Nhatrang, Soctrang, Touraine, Simreap" X Japan determined acquire above quickly, diplomatically

if possible or by force if necessary in order expand and strengthen them X Chief reason given is to prevent British moving in.

Berlin to Tokyo 21 June 739:

Ribbentrop reluctant to force issue now.

Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 22 June 549 and 246 respectively:

Matsuoka will negotiate directly with French X Repeats determination get bases soon.

Tokyo to Vichy 28 June 258:

French Indo-China base question this date receives Imperial sanction.

30 June 252:

Japan now considers it absolutely essential to force France accede to demands for above bases.

[8] Top secret

15 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cincpac

151924

Summary of Tokyo to Washington fifteen July three six eight X Relayed to London X Quote within next day or two Japan Vichy commercial negotiations begin X Japan will propose in name of mutual defense taking over southern French Indo China naval and air bases outlined in Jonab dated seven July X At same time Japan will attempt to station necessary army navy air forces in that area peacefully with French agreement if possible X If French object Japan has decided to use force X Japan does not intend move further south or interfere with colonial government X Move necessary to guarantee supplies from colony and Thailand and prevent Syrian type British action X Tokyo wishes avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United States if possible but risk is necessary unquote.

[9] Top secret

17 July 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info: CINCPAC

180300

Tokyo to Vichy twelve July two seven four and two seven five list six terms of ultimatum to be answered by twenty July x Japan will send necessary army navy air forces to southern French Indo China x French turn over naval and air bases listed in Jonab of seven July x expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely x French withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes x Vichy authorize French Indo China military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing x colony to pay Japan twenty three million piastres annually to meet cost of occupation xx Tokyo to Vichy fourteen July two eight one army now planning advance on or about twenty July xx Tokyo to Saigon and Hanoi sixteen July circular one five one eight formal demands presented to Vichy on fourteenth x reply asked by twentieth x Japan intends carry out plans by force if opposed or if British or United States interferes x Kanju Maru being held at Saigon to evacuate all Japanese there sailing early dawn twenty four July x burn codes x Japanese in northern area evacuate or move into Hanol.

[10] Top secret
 19 July 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCAF
 Info: CINCPAC
 193230

Purple fourteen July Canton to Tokyo two five five quote information from military officials to attaches in Canton follows x one x the recent general mobilization order expresses Japans irrevocable resolution to end Anglo American assistance in thwarting Japans natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out with the backing of the Axis if possible but alone if necessary x formalities such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them were dispensed with to avoid alarm and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude x two x immediate object will be to attempt peaceful French Indo China occupation but will crush resistance if offered and set up martial law x secondly our purpose is to launch therefrom a rapid attack when the international situation is suitable x after occupation next on our schedule is sending ultimatum to Netherlands Indies x in the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part x Army will need only one division to seize Singapore and two divisions to seize Netherlands Indies x with air forces based on Canton comma Spratley comma Palau comma Singora in Thailand comma Portuguese Timor and Indo China and with submarine fleet in Mandates comma Hainan comma and Indo China we will crush British American military power and ability to assist in schemes against us x three x occupying force will be reorganized as twenty fifth Army corps of four divisions and also thirtieth Army corps consisting of South China forces to be assigned special duty with airplanes tanks and howitzers x General Iida in command will set up headquarters in Saigon x preparation complete x expedition will soon proceed from here unquote parenthesis note by Opnav it should be noted that above is not a directive but appears to express thinking and opinions of Canton orange military parenthesis.

[11] Top secret
 19 July 1941
 From: COM SIXTEEN
 Action: OPNAV
 Info: CINCPAC CINCAF
 191514

Tokyo to met number fifteen sixty of nineteenth in prep affirm code states that although cabinet has changed there will of course be no departure from the principle that tripartite pact forms keystone of Japans national policy and new cabinet will also pursue policy of former cabinet in all other matters.

[12] Top secret
 20 July 1941
 From: COM 16
 Action: CINCPAC ROUTINE, CINCAF ROUTINE, COM 14 ROUTINE, OPNAV
 PRIORITY
 Info:
 2013356

Tokyo to Vichy number two nine five purple of nineteenth XX army has all preparations made XX have decided to advance on twenty fourth regardless of whether demands accepted or not X orders for advance will be issued on July twenty third Japanese time X remainder of message contains instructions to ambassador regarding exchange of official documents in case of acceptance X instructions regarding notifying Tokyo of Frances reply etcetera.

[13] Top secret

25 July 1941

From: Chief of naval operations.

Action: Addressees as per attached list.

Info:

251600

At twelve hundred get July twenty sixth 1941 execute wpl51 except the ninth to eighteenth words inclusive of task baker of paragraph seven the word United States being considered as one word X The excepted words will be executed at a later date after necessary arrangements have been made

Addressees for despatch concerning execution of wpl-51

By rapid communication means to:

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (require acknowledgement from this addressee).

Commander, Battleships, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Transports, Atlantic Fleet.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda.

Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

Special Naval Observer, London.

U. S. Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada.

By registered air mail to:

President, Naval War College; Commandant, First Naval District; Commandant, Third Naval District; Commandant, Fourth Naval District; Commandant, Fifth Naval District; Commandant, Sixth Naval District; Commandant, Seventh Naval District; Commandant, Eighth Naval District; Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

By registered ordinary mail to:

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District; Commandant, Twelfth Naval District; Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District; Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

[14] Top secret

25 JULY 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

Action: CINCPAC CINCAF CINCLANT COM 15 SPENAVO London

Info:

252023

This is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X Appropriate Adecs deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chaney in London XX You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan X It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material X It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X It is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present

be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date XX This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army subordinates X SPENAVO inform CNS but warn him against disclosure X Action addrees this dis are cincpac cinclant cincaf com fi'teen spenavo London

(Deliver one copy to War Plans Division U. S. Army)

[15] Top secret

14 AUGUST 1941.

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT
Info: COM 11-12-13—COM 14-15-16.
142155

Indications that orange ships formerly in North Atlantic and those on South Atlantic routes returning Japan via Magellan comma 4 tankers only vessels on Pacific coast, none enroute to USA, none North Atlantic, estimated 17 west coast of South America, none Los Angeles to Panama. Japanese rapidly completing withdrawal from world shipping routes. Scheduled sailings cancelled and majority ships in other than China and Japan seas areas home-ward bound. Resumption of shipping services indefinite result of USA, British and Dutch pressure through refusal of transit of Panama Canal, export control restrictions, refusal of bunkering and port facilities and fund freezing.

[16] Top Secret.

28 AUGUST 1941.

From: CNO.
Action: CINCPAC Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Info: CINCLANT; SPENAVO. LON; Commander Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier; Commander Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier & COM 11.
282121

(Paraphrase)

Certain operations prescribed for the Atlantic by WPL 51 are hereby extended to areas of the Pacific Ocean as described herein in view of the destruction by raiders of merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean within the Western Hemisphere neutrality zone as defined in the declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939. Formal changes in WPL 51 will be issued but meanwhile action addressees will execute immediately the following instructions. CINCPAC constitute the Southeast Pacific Force consisting of two 7500 ton light cruisers and dispatch it to Balboa. For task purposes this force will operate directly under CNO after entering the Southeast Pacific sub area as defined in WPL 46 para 3222 except western limit is longitude 190 degrees west. Within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier and within the Southeast Pacific sub area the commander Panama naval coastal frontier and commander Southeast Pacific Force will in cooperation and acting under the strategic direction of the Chief of Naval Operations execute the following task colon Destroy surface raiders which attack or threaten United States flag shipping. Interpret an approach of surface raiders within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier or the Pacific Southeast sub area as a threat to United States flag shipping. XX For the present the forces concerned will base Balboa but CNO will endeavor to make arrangements for basing on South American ports as may be required XX Action Adees and commander Southeast Pacific Force inform CNO when these instructions have been placed in effect. XX

Distribution:

Copies to 12, 16, 20, 30, 38, 38W; WPD, U. S. Army; Brit. Nav. Staff in Washington.

[17] Top Secret.

9 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: All U. S. holders of WPL fifty-two outside of Navy Department

Info:

Ø82335

(Paraphrase)

On October 11th at 0200 GCT cancel WPL 51 and place WPL 52 in effect.

[18] Top Secret.

16 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (Acknowledge).

Info:

1622Ø3

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third Arees inform appropriate Army and Naval District authorities X Acknowledge XX

[19] Top Secret.

16 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV.

Action: All merchant ships.

Info:

1623ØØ

(Paraphrase)

The following despatch is for all United States merchant ships in the Pacific: There is a possibility of hostile action by Japan against U. S. shipping. United States merchant ships at sea in the Pacific proceed now as follows: In Chinese waters, China Sea or Dutch Indies waters, proceed immediately to Manila, Singapore, or a North Australian Port. In North Pacific westbound, except those bound to Vladivostok, proceed to Honolulu unless close to the Philippines, in the latter case proceed there. Ships bound for Vladivostok, proceed on voyage. If Honolulu bound continue voyage. If in North Pacific eastbound, continue voyage. If in South Pacific, continue voyage. Vessels operating coastwise off of South America or between the United States and the west coast of South America, continue voyage. All coastwise shipping eastern Pacific, continue voyage. Usual trade routes should be avoided.

[20] Top secret.

1Ø/17/41.

From: OPNAV.

Action: NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA COM 11, 12, 13, 14 NAVDISTRICTS
CINCPAC CINCAF COM 15, 16.

Info:

162239.

Attention invited to OPNAV warning merchant vessels 1623ØØ this date X Routing instructions will be sent you later.

[21] Top secret.

19-17-41.

From: OPNAV.

Action: CINCAF COM 12.

Info: COM 11, 15, 13, 16, 14 CINCPAC NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA ALUSNA
Melbourne and British Admiralty Delegation Washn.

162258.

(Paraphrase)

Effective immediately route all trans-Pacific U. S. flag shipping to and from the following areas Far East area plus Shanghai and India and East India area as defined in WPL 46 thru Torres Straits keeping to the southward and well clear of Orange mandates taking maximum advantage of Dutch and Australian patrolled areas X Make arrangements with Australian naval board for Torres Straits pilots.

[22] Top secret.

17 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCPAC.

Info:

171458.

(Paraphrase)

Because of the great importance of continuing to reenforce the Philippines with long range Army bombers you are requested to take all practicable precautions for the safety of the airfields at Wake and Midway.

[23] Top secret

23 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: COM 12 COM 14 CINCPAC CINCAF COM 16.

Info: COM 11 COM 13 COM 15 NAVSTA GUAM.

222258

[Paraphrase]

Until further orders all army and navy transpacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo will be escorted both ways between Honolulu and Manila. Authorized route slow vessels in above categories which would unduly prolong voyage via Torres Straits without escort. To insure minimum demands for escort from Pacific fleet schedules must be arranged so that these ships proceed in company. CINCAF should take over escort when and where practicable as arranged between CINCPAC and CINCAF. General escorting other transpacific American flag shipping not considered warranted at this time in view of routing prescribed in my 162258. Where cargo in merchant bottoms for Guam is involved normal routing is authorized.

Cargo for Guam should be so assembled and loaded that a minimum number of ships be required to make that port. Reference COM 12 despatches to CINCPAC Nos. 212352 and 212358 and CINCAF confidential serial #1633.

[24] Top secret

4 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC; CINCAF; COM 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

Info:

041800

Japanese merchant vessels complete withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters appears in progress. Ships in area have departed or are preparing to depart except Naruto presently completing run from west coast of Mexico for South American ports. No ships presently reported en route from Japan.

[25] Top secret

18 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14
 Info:
 181705

[Paraphrase]

In convoy with American flag vessels, placing of Bloemfontein is authorized. Until international conditions on and subsequent to 25 Nov. become defined and clarified however any further direct or great circle routing between Hawaii and Philippines should not repeat not be used. Until further advised by Dept. routes south of mandates should be prescribed.

[26] Top secret

20 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCAF, COMPACSO NAVCOASTAL FRONTIER.
 Info: CINCPAC COM-14, COM-16
 192235

Routing proposed by COM-14 150118 satisfactory. CINCAF and Comdr. Pacific southern naval coastal frontier coordinate routing to avoid congestion.

[27] Top secret

21 November 1941

From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF
 Info: Com 14, Com 16
 211755

Reliable reports indicate the recent establishment by Japan of a combined air and surface craft patrol covering shipping routes from the U S to Australasia X Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from base at Jaluit X Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands X Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations X Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in areas vicinity Bathurst Island X Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres Strait X They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets X

[28] Top secret

22 November 41

From: CINCPAC
 Action: OPNAV
 Info: CINCAF Com 12, 14, 16
 220417

Manila convoy consisting Coast Farmer Admiral Halstead Chaumont Meigs Republic Holbrook Bloemfontein reporting Com fourteen with conflicting routings X Due depart Honolulu twentyseven November ten knots X First three ships have cargo for Guam and Chaumont personnel for Midway Wake X Last two cannot use Torres routing because limited fresh water radius X Only one cruiser detailed escort X In view above and information OPNAV 211755 consider route via Guam no additional hazard X Unless otherwise directed will instruct Com fourteen route all via northern route Chaumont departing two days early and joining convoy in vicinity Wake thence via Guam and San Bernardino X No escort for Chaumont as far as Wake considered necessary at present X Request CINCAF arrange escort Guam ships to Manila if delays discharging necessitate splitting convoy at Guam

[29] Top secret

22 November 1941

From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCPAC
 Info: CINCAF Com 12 Com 16 Com 14
 221805

Urdis 220417 X Pacific situation unchanged comply my 181705 X Guam cargo should be sent Manila then transshipped for Guam X Make other arrangements

personnel in Chaumont for Midway and Wake X Bloemfontein and Holbrook obtain water en route at Tutuila Suva or other port as expedient
 Ref: 11-664. Manila convoy consisting reporting Com 14 with conflicting orders for routing X
 Ref: 11-533 Placing Bloemfontein in convoy . . . direct routes not to be used between Hawaii and Philippines

[30] Top secret
 23 November 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCPAC
 Info: COM 16-12-14, CINCAF
 221801

My dispatch 181705 and 192235. Move Point Baker further to south of Ellice Islands. Refer last sentence first mentioned dispatch routes south of mandates means through Torres Straits.

[31] Top secret
 23 November 1941
 From: COM 12
 Action: OPNAV
 Info: CINCPAC
 230258

[Paraphrase]

Department dispatches apparently do not take cognizance of magnitude of Army troop movement directed by War Department from San Francisco by December 19 involving about 22 vessels including largest liners. Aside from troop transportation about 12 merchant on scheduled voyages ready to sail trans Pacific. Seven vessels already sailed. Com 12 organizing 17 knot convoy to depart San Francisco by December 8. Also planning 10 knot convoy to assemble Honolulu by December 15 routings prescribed eastward of Ellice Islands thence Torres Straits. Watering necessary practically all vessels especially troop transports. In view reports Japanese patrolling this area believe it vulnerable. Subject to further study believe routing south about Australia impracticable. If troop movement must be made at this time recommend great circle course to San Bernardino Strait with adequate fleet protection.

[32] Top secret
 November 24, 1941
 From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
 Action: CINCAF CINCPAC COM11 COM12 COM13 COM15
 Info: SPENAVO London CINCLANT
 242005

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.

Copy to WPD, War Dept. and to Op-12 *but no other distribution.*

[33] Top secret
 November 24, 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCAF
 Info: COM 16 ALUSNA, CHUNGKING, ASTALUSNA, SHANGHAI; ALUSNA, TOKYO; CINCPAC
 242239

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addresses are often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature X Since Com 16

1406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to Com 16 for action OPNAV for information X After combining all incoming reports Com 16 direct dispatches to OPNAV info CINCPAC based on all information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity X Request CINCAF issue directive as necessary to fulfill general objective

[34] Top secret

25 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: COM 12
Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14, COM 16
252203

Route all transpacific shipping thru Torres Straits. CINCPAC and CINCAF provide necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.

[35] Top secret

27 November 1941
From: OPNAV 38S
Action: Commandants all Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF.
Info: CINCLANT
271519

On account of fact that existing and subsequent merchant ship codes may be compromised the use of secret positions in assignment of routes for merchant ships will be initiated as rapidly as possible and instructions for their use given to masters as this will enable directions for diversions to be given without disclosing to axis nations the location of our ships.

[36] Top secret

November 7, 1941.
From: Chief of Naval Operations
Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC
Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO
272337

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD, War Dept.

[37] Top Secret

27 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: Coms 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-15 Navyyard Washn Governor Guam & Samoa
Info:
272338

(Paraphrase)

Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent probability extension orange operations X Publicity to be avoided.

[38] Top Secret

November 8, 1941

From: Chief of Naval Operations
 Action: Com PNNCF Com PSNCF
 Info: CINCPAC Com PNCF
 290110

Refer to my 272338 X Army has sent following to commander western defense command quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers X Unquote XX WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific sub area and Panama naval coastal frontier X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur

[39] Top Secret

2 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCAF
 Info:
 012356

(Paraphrase)

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this despatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol". Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by president as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out president's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both army and navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

[40] Top Secret

3 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action CINCAF, CINCPAC, Com 14, Com 16
 Info:
 031850

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X

[41] Top Secret
 3 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCAF, Com Sixteen
 Info: CINPAC, Com Fourteen
 031855

Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy Purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy Purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied

[42] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: ALUSNA Tokyo, ALUSNA Bankok, ASTALUSNA Peiping, ASTALUSNA Shanghai
 Info: CINCAF, ALUSNA Changking, Com 16
 040330

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word Jabberwock. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".

[43] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CO MARDET Peiping, CO MARDET Tientsin
 Info: CINCAF, Com 16
 040343

Destroy this system at discretion and send word Jabberwock when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by Mardets Peiping and Tientsin and reported by word "Boomerang" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.

[44] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: NAVSTA Guam
 Info: CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16
 042017

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16 and OPNAV X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained

[45] Top Secret
 6 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCPAC
 Info: CINCAF
 061743

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

[46] Top Secret.
 December 6, 1941
 From: COM FOURTEEN
 Action: OPNAV
 Info:
 060114

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

EXHIBIT NO. 38

(Copy)

Drafting Section;
 Administrative
 Drafting Officer
 T. J. H.
 G-2 File Number:

PARAVIEWING OF AN OUTGOING SECRET RADIOGRAM

No. 20, Sent Dec. 5, 1941

Date: December 8, 1941

To: Military Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.

Memorize emergency key word 22 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document tag, SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD need stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word HIXAH stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador.

MILES

EXHIBIT NO. 39

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A. M., E. S. T., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

(Signed) L. T. Grew

L. T. Grew,

Friendship General,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

The attached message was taken personally by direction of the Chief of Staff to the War Department Message Center by Colonel Bratton, G-2, who gave it in person to the Message Center Chief, Colonel French, at 11:50 a. m., Decem-